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Onsi: Conglomerates' Goals -- And Their Attainments

Many conglomerate companies on the glittering sur
face look like paragons of efficiency
wisdom. This author suggests, however, that perhaps
the wrong indicators are being
to give this ap
pearance of health and offers a more rigid measure of
performance—

CONGLOMERATES’ GOALS—AND
THEIR ATTAINMENTS
by Mohamed Onsi
Syracuse University

early sixties, a business
movement toward conglomera
tion emerged. The conglomerate
company is believed to be differ
ent in its philosophy and organiza
tional structure. The success of
the leading conglomerate compa
nies has impressed the financial
and business communities, at least
for a decade, with the conglomer
ate concept. The indicators of the
success of a conglomerate’s goal
attainment traditionally have been
primarily financially oriented.
This article presents the find
ings of an empirical study con
ducted in 1968 to determine con
glomerate goals as top executives
n the
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of six such companies view them1
and to evaluate whether the indi
cators used to measure conglomer
ate goal achievement were proper
or satisfactory for this purpose.
It is possible for goal attainment
measured by one index to show
a success while if it is measured
by another, or by multiple in
dices, it may show certain fail
ures. Accordingly, whether a con
glomerate’s goal attainment was a
success or not depends on the use
of appropriate measurements and
the weight given to each. For
those who make decisions based on
those indicators, the relative cohe
siveness of such signposts to what

they are supposed to indicate is
important. Misleading financial de
cisions can easily be made if they
are based on analysis that has used
wrong indicators to measure the
right parameters or used correct
indicators to measure irrelevant
parameters.

Goals of a conglomerate
On the basis of information ob
tained during interviews, conglom
erate goals can be stated follows:
Maximize sales subject to a profit
per share constraint—Many con
glomerates believe in a goal of
maximizing sales volume subject to
49
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share constraint. This is resolved
glomerate management interest is
into a profit constraint for each
to achieve individual prestige, per
sonal satisfaction, and the power
subsidiary or division based on a
budgeted rate of return on assets
to meet management ambitions.
 of return on sales.
and/or a rate
For example, the president of
Monogram Industries (Mr. Stone)
Goals and constraints are not syn
states that empire building and per
onymous. Many conglomerate pres
sonal attitude are the explanation
idents stated that they want to
achieve a one-billion-dollar sales
for many acquisitions, rather than
figure with no mention, for exam
profitability.5 Also, the president of
ple, of achieving a 15 per cent net
Litton (Mr. R. Ash) states that
profit after taxes. However, their
“when they (conglomerate compa
expectation is to have a profit level
nies ) stop making acquisitions,
they probably won’t be regarded
higher than that of the noncon
as conglomerates and will merely
glomerates.
be considered alongside other al
Rapid growth rate—Merger and
ready matured and well-structured
acquisition become a goal in them
multi-industry companies.”6 The
selves to supplement the internal
theme becomes not why so much
growth rate toward the desired
merger, but, rather, why not more
level of profit per share.2 In many
merger? In personal interviews with
a conglomerate, the profit plan ac
top conglomerate officers, it was
counts for a specific percentage of
... it was found that, while
found that, while mergers serve
its projected growth through acqui
management interest (pride of
sitions.3 It was found that a con
mergers serve management
building an empire from scratch),
glomerate buys a company if the
management believes that they also
price is favorable, even if the pur
interest (pride of building
benefit stockholders through a rapid
chase doesn’t promise any imme
an empire from scratch),
growth of profit per share and a
diate boost in earnings. The reason
sharp rise in stock prices. (This
is that the conglomerate wants the
management believes that
point will be discussed later.)
assets so that it can borrow heavily
Strengthening conglomerate pow
against
them
and
gain
an
import
they also benefit stockholders
er—Conglomerate power is divided
ant source of cash. Such a con
through a rapid growth of
into two parts: (a) market power:
glomerate has another strict policy
If a conglomerate possesses market
that “no more than 10 per cent
profit per share and a sharp
power
in some markets, such power
net profit will be in one indus
try.
becomes a vehicle for the achieve
rise in stock prices.
ment of market power elsewhere,
Merger activity by conglomer
and (b) conglomerate financial
ates, however, is believed to be
power enables it to use profits
carried out for reasons other than
earned in one of its constituent
profitability, leading to conflict be
parts to subsidize its expansion in
tween the interest of stockholders
certain markets more powerfully
than nonconglomerate companies.7
From evidence in personal inter
MOHAMED ONSI is as
views, this latter power has been
sociate professor of ac
counting
at
Syracuse
the most rewarding for a conglom
University's College of
erate.
Business Administration.
He received his bacca
Maintaining entrepreneural spirit
laureate
with
honors
—A flexible conglomerate structure
from
Cairo
University
is advocated to provide more de
and his M.S. and Ph.D.
from the University of
centralized and motivational forces
Illinois. Dr. Onsi instructed at both univer
than
exist in other companies.8 For
sities he attended and then taught at
example, the organizational struc
Fresno State College, California, before go
ing to Syracuse. He currently is educational
ture of some conglomerates is
director of the Syracuse Chapter of the
based on separate subsidiaries that,
National Association of Accountants and a
member of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
in many cases, are not 100 per
American Accounting Association. In 1967
cent owned by the conglomerate.
he received the NAA's Distinguished Manu
script Award.
Strategy and control are central50
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Attainments
ized in a relatively small number
ganization Goals
and are
more
of top management groups, while
and quantifiable. They are used
operations are highly decentralized.
a basis for developing the subsidi
Headquarters officers are expert
ary budget. For our purposes here,
“trouble shooters” and specialists
such sub-goals will not be com
who provide the acquired compa
mented upon.
nies with the expert opinions that
enable the unit to achieve greater
Evaluating conglomerate goals
growth.9 The conglomerate top
management, in reality, acts as a
A. Does a rapid merger-acquisi
“management consultant” with di
tion system yield high profit and
recting power. Such a managerial
rapid growth?
asset, management asserts, is the
It is difficult to know how much
hallmark of a conglomerate and
of the profitability of a conglom
a thing that it
for in ac
erate is based on improved pro
quiring companies. As a president
ducts and efficiencies and how
of a conglomerate put it, “A con
much reflects the attractive arith
glomerate can take any unprofit
metic
acquisition. The total
able company and turn it to profit
profitability growth comes from
in two years.” To maintain such
three sources: (a) internal growth
Conglomerate management
managerial talent, the conglomer
of the original divisions, excluding
ates have the most generous com
artificial growth due to inflationary
is willing to take, more
pensation bonuses in industry.
trends, (b) external growth stem
often, a high degree of
Stability—This goal is achieved
ming from acquired or merged
through a system of diversification,
subsidiaries during the year, and
risk that either pays off by
e.g., a cyclical business is offset by
(c) artificial growth due to ac
a counter-cyclical one. Using the
counting measurements such as
a substantial return or,
“project redeployment concept,”10 a
those emerging from “pooling of
alternatively, earns
conglomerate reduces its depend
interests” vs. “purchase,” in addi
ence on any one product, technol
tion to the impact of different ac
practically no profit. This
or business. This goal influ
counting methods that may con
ences the acquisition program and,
tribute to this artificial growth of
managerial attitude is
accordingly, the profit level.
net income.
encouraged by the fact that
Aggressive risk taking—Conglom
Conglomerates amalgamate these
erate management is willing to
three sources of growth together
another merger will come in
take, more often, a high degree
into one figure that does not dis
of risk that either pays off by a
close the materiality of each source
very soon and that the total
substantial return
alternatively,
or its trend. This makes it difficult
aggregate will not disclose
earns practically no profit. This
to evaluate the validity of the as
managerial attitude is encouraged
sertion of so many conglomerate
a bad result.
by the fact that another merger
presidents who boast publicly of
will come in very soon and that
the wonderful turnaround of prof
the total aggregate will not dis
itability of many of the acquired
close a bad result. This attitude is
companies.11
supported by observation of the
While conglomerates attempt to
fact that the projects selected have
iron out any anticipated difficulties
different mixes of risk and return
of merger or any problems imme
characteristics.
diately arising after acquisition to
It should be noted that the
improve profitability,12 the turn
above goals are interdependent
around is not always accomplished,
and, as such, could be classified as
and the merger financially may
major goals and secondary ones.
prove to be less than successful.
For our purpose, this is of lesser
The following observations support
importance. Also, there are sub
this:
goals that a conglomerate estab
a. In many cases, conglomerates
lishes for its subsidiaries or divi
pay a high price for the acquired
sons. Such sub-goals, established
company, thus earning a low rate
in budget manuals, are consistent
of return on the investment. Since
with the goals of the mother or
this merger achieves growth in
May-June, 1970
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sales andManagement
assets, however,
the
years,
during Systems,
which period
his Vol.
types
of corporations
merger is considered acceptable.
managerial effort relaxes, and then
No significant difference was found
In addition, merger in conglomer
the acquired company may become
between the management control
ate companies is financed by issu
less profitable. This is the case in
system of conglomerates and some
ing either preferred stocks or/and
many of the new conglomerates.
of the well established, large com
debentures, but not common stocks,
panies that are nonconglomerate.
d. Conglomerates’ mergers and ac
unless management knows that the
However, there was some evidence
quisitions have shown higher fail
acquired company has a high prob
in favor of the conglomerate in
ure figures than other companies’,14
ability of yielding not only a high
terms of motivation, through its use
which proves that either: (i) The
sales volume but also a high profit
of generous incentive compensa
conglomerate management did not
tion. The evidence that this motiva
rate. Lear Siegler has a policy of
have time to study and evaluate
tional impetus induces a higher
not issuing common stock unless
the future of the acquired com
level of performance is not, how
profit per share issued is estimated
pany before its merger, or (ii) the
ever, conclusive.
to be at least one and a half times
conglomerate management knew
the earnings per share of the con
Distinction should be made be
about the expected failure of the
tween
(a) the efficiency of the
glomerate’s fiscal year. G & W re
acquired company, but gambled
quires that new acquisitions must
conglomerate
’s individual plants
heavily on its own overestimated
(i.e.,
plant
economies
or econo
promise at least 10 to 12 per cent
managerial capability to turn it into
mies of mass production) and
return on investment and that the
a profitable one, or (iii) merger is
(b) the added economies, if any,
acquired company should not have
used as a hedge to counteract the
a price earnings ratio higher than
resulting from the operation of sev
decline in profitability in one year,
eral units under common manage
its own. This last point is very im
even if it means the acquisition will
ment (administrative economies of
portant, since, if a conglomerate
add problems later. This is to say,
scale). The first economy is a func
has a P/E ratio of 40, it will be
for short-term considerations, ac
tion of size, e.g., the optimum size
able to buy a company for an over
quisitions are made even if they
beyond which further expansion
estimated price, equal, for exam
are bad for long-term purposes,
will result in diminishing returns.
ple, to 30 times its P/E.
and (iv) in many cases where
The second economy is a function
b. Many conglomerates acquire
mergers were made to enable the
of the possibility of having econo
firms of larger size than them
conglomerate to “make” the prod
mies in such areas
distribution,
selves, resulting in a sudden ex
uct instead of “buying” it, the anal
overhead,
and
research
vs. the pos
pansion of the acquiring firm that
ysis used ignored many intangibles
sibility that such advantages may
may be less profitable than a stepthat were “critical” for the inter
be offset by cost increases stem
by-step expansion subject to repet
mediate term.
ming from duplication of staff,
itive re-examination of costs and
problems of communication, mana
benefits for each additional incre
gerial gap, slow response to
Finance mergers pay off best
ment of growth. In many cases, the
changes in markets or supply, and
increment of expansion through
The biggest dollar payoff from
the lack of flexibility implied by
mergers is too large for the con
synergistic effects after acquisition,
central controls over hundreds of
glomerate to control effectively,
however, resulted from finance
plants.
and increases in cost may result
mergers, followed by marketing
Efficiency, in its economic mean
rather than the expected econo
mergers, followed by technological
ing (e.g., most effective utilization
mies. Cost increases are least likely
mergers, and, finally, production
of the means of production leading
to affect profit in a firm which
mergers.
This
explains
the
new
ten
to
producing a certain quantity
makes a large number of acquisi
dency
of
conglomerates
to
acquire
with
the least expenditure) is not
tions, and the timing of their re
insurance
companies.
The
reason
easy
to measure in a conglomer
flection on earnings will not be
that
synergistic
effects
in
the
fields
ate.
15
As a substitute, top manage
immediate in the short run due to
ment
of conglomerates assumes
of production and technology do
the ability of the conglomerate to
that profitability is a measure of
not rank high is that the conglom
absorb losses higher than noncon
efficiency (i.e., profitability reflects
erate acquires companies with dif
glomerates can absorb.
economic efficiency).16 Conglomer
ferent
production and dif
c. In many cases, the acquired
ates have worked hard to convince
ferent technological skills, so that
company has a product that is
stockholders,
investors, etc., that
significant
economies
of
scale
may
good, and competitive for the time
the
high
profits
earned reflect their
not be achieved.
being.13 However, the acquired
high level of efficiency.17 This, in
B. Is a conglomerate company
company may be technologically
reality, is not true. A conglomerate
more efficient than a nonconglom
obsolete in the near future. In
that has sufficient monopolistic
erate?
other instances, the company may
power in one of its markets may
Conglomerates are generally not
have been created by an individual
be extremely profitable, but not
more or less efficient than other
who is going to retire in 1 to 3
52

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/mgmtservices/vol7/iss3/7

Management Services

4

Onsi: Conglomerates'
Goals
-- And
Their Attainments
1. Divisional
high
profit
may
necessarily because of its efficiency
C. Does a conglomerate’s highnot be the result of greater eco
or cost reductions. Conglomerate
risk-taking attitude pay off?
nomic efficiency, but due rather to
companies have ignored the dis
The risk in conglomerate activity
a certain degree of monopoly—es
tinction between financial efficiency
is very high. For example, in an
pecially for companies in a highly
and economic (or real) efficiency.
empirical study of acquisitions, it
technological area where research
The assumption that control of
was found that 45 per cent of the
is the dominant factor.
plural production units by a single
total acquisitions investigated con
2. Earnings per share in a par
conglomerate contributes to effi
sisted of the conglomerate type,
ticular year can be legitimately
ciency would seem to rest upon
and 42 per cent of all the failures
controlled within certain, quite
an overwhelming absence of sup
occurring were in the conglomer
broad, limits, e.g., “income man
porting facts. To the contrary, the
ate group.21 This suggests the con
agement. Cost allocation, transfer
individual unit is likely to become
clusion that conglomerate risk re
pricing, inventory valuation, . . .
less efficient than that owned by
duction (as assumed) evidently
etc.,” are used as tools in the hands
a company concentrated in one
bears its own risk. The reason for
of management to provide a “man
field. Conglomerate management
such high risk is the possibility of
aged income” figure. For example,
competence gets diluted by prolif
deficiencies in the planning and
allocation of headquarters expendi
eration into strange industries, and
control system of a conglomerate.
the stranger the invaded industry
tures to subsidiaries in one con
Conglomerate top management, in
the greater the dilution. The more
glomerate is based on how much
many cases, does not know the
top management wants profit per
foreign to the conglomerate tech
changing activities of its subsidi
share of this subsidiary to be.20 As
nology and competence the ac
aries, and, as a result, it pressures
quired company, the poorer man
the head of a conglomerate put it,
the divisional unit into activities
agement efficiency will be.
“What you want is a nice, steady
that seem attractive and profitable,
rise in per share earnings—no sur
Evidence cannot be dismissed
but for which the unit is not ready.
prises, especially on the downside.”
In addition, control procedures
that the earnings of the separate
3. Conglomerate financial power
units before merger on the average
a conglomerate emphasize financial
contributes significantly to high
were greater than the earnings of
measures on a monthly basis, in
profitability (more than in noncon
total aggregate, that may not pin
the same units after consolidation,
glomerate cases and more than that
point any underlying troubles for
as shown in some empirical stud
attributable to conglomerate eco
some time. When such measures
ies.18 This may be due to “mana
nomic efficiency) due to low costs
reveal the failures, it is too late.
gerial gap” (or/and “motivation
of materials, a reflection of buying
Our interviews showed that the
gap”) between the competence of
power, and due to low overhead.
control systems of conglomerates
the conglomerate’s top management
These are reflections of economies
are widely varied, some good and
and the individual unit. This is the
of multiple operations, and not
some bad. Even in those conglom
reason that many conglomerates
necessarily economic efficiency.
erates with good management con
transfer a headquarters officer to
For the above reasons, one is led
trol systems, there is no significant
the acquired units. Many conglom
to
believe
that
the
profit
figure,
difference
between the quality of
erate officers have stated that it
as
measured
today
for
a
conglom
these systems and those of some
takes from three to five years to
erate, is not a meaningful figure,
large companies that are noncon
integrate such a unit into the total
unfortunately. In addition, measur
glomerate.
conglomerate control system and
ing profit by major product line,
Risk taking, however, differs
turn it into a profitable or highly
while a meaningful step, falls short
among organizational levels. A con
profitable
of solving the problem. If the ac
glomerate’s top executives may be
Gulf & Western Industries states
countant and SEC want to provide
perfectly willing to risk millions on
that “the average operating subsid
an index of management efficiency,
a project where the chances of
iary of G & W has achieved a com
success are low, but the potential
an accounting figure is a weak in
pound annual growth rate of 15.9
rewards are very high. Failure in
dicator. More than one index is
per cent in operating profits; and
some projects, due to averaging,
needed.
A
meaningful
approach
the most recent internal earnings
won’t materially hurt the conglom
to
pinpoint
management
efficiency
growth, from fiscal
to fiscal
erate. But since a divisional man
would
be
to
disclose
publicly
budg
1967, shows an internal profit after
ager is under pressure to produce
etary
data
for
each
major
product
tax increase
18.5 per cent.”19 If
divisional profits to keep his bo
segment of a conglomerate and
it is assumed that these figures are
nuses up, he is more likely to favor
compare them with actual achieve
indicators of the internal growth
low-risk projects.22 However, in
ment. Other indices, in addition to
this company, one may ask if this
one conglomerate, risk taking was
accounting
profit,
could
also
be
dis
is a measure of management effi
found
to differ widely among sub
closed,
providing
meaningful
meas
ciency. Accounting profit is not a
sidiaries
or major divisions, i.e.,
ures
of
other
dimensions
of
valid indicator of management effi
the
risk-taking
attitude of a movie
management efficiency.
ciency for the following reasons:
May-June, 1970
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mies, contributes significantly to
nonconglomerate. Such a hypothe
production division is different
total
conglomerate profit. If these
sis
is
rejected
because
the
differ
from that of a cigarette production
two
factors
do not exist, the con
ence
in
efficiency
level
between
division.
glomerate
is
likely to lose a large
conglomerates and nonconglomer
part
of
the
claimed
profits. The at
ates was not significant. There was
Conclusion
titude
of
the
accounting
profession
a wide variation in the efficiency
in
measuring
profit
per
residual
From interviews with several ex
level between conglomerates, which
share
is
a
step
in
the
right
direc
ecutives of conglomerate compa
proves that they show the same
tion.
However,
such
a
step
is far
nies in the summer and fall of
pattern of behavior by industry,
too
limited
in
dealing
with
the
1968 and other material obtained,
size, product, classification, . . . etc.
complicated
problems
of
generating
it can be said that conglomerates
Profit per share is a poor indi
indicators to measure the efficiency
have used the wrong indicators to
cator of management efficiency. In
of conglomerate management.
measure the attainment of their
a conglomerate, reported profit is
The proposal mentioned above
goals, especially the profit goal.
the result of many factors, some
of publishing budgetary data would
There is no evidence to support
of which are more important than
be a long stride forward in that
the hypothesis that a conglomerate
others. Profit increase, as a result
direction.
company is more efficient than a
of mergers and financial econo
1 A conglomerate is a company operating
across a number of different unrelated
economic markets, and the mix of its
market is constantly changing. This issue,
however, is not critical for our purpose
here since the companies interviewed

are the leaders of the conglomerate
movement and would be described as
such under
definition.
2 This is evidenced in the period 1960-66,
when 72 per cent of all types of merg
ers were conglomerate in nature. See:
“Selection and Opinion,” Value Line
Survey, April 28, 1967, p. 468.
3 For example, see the views of the ex
ecutive vice-president of Lear Siegler,
conglomerate, Robert L. Purcell, Build
ing Conglomerate Company, Financial
Executive, March, 1968, p. 20.
4 A relationship between sales and execu
tive income, but not between profits
and executive income, is found. For ex
ample, doubling company size increases
compensation to top management
about
per cent. See: A. Patton, De
terioration in Top Executive Pay,” Har
vard Business Review, November-De
cember, 1965, pp. 106-118. Patton notes
that in 1964, 60.8 per cent of the vari
ance in top executive pay was explained
by differences in company sales. Since
sales growth (rather than profitability) is
such an important variable in determining
management’s income, there is conflict
between management interest and the

stockholders’ interest. See also: McGuire,
and Elbing, “Executive Incomes,
Sales and Profits,” American Economic
Review, September, 1962, pp. 753-761;
D. R. Roberts, Executive Compensation
(Glenmore, 1959); and S. Reid testi
mony before the Subcommittee
Anti
trust and Monopoly, Economic Concen
tration, Part V, pp. 1919-1934.
5 The Wall Street Journal, August 12,
1968, p. 13.
6 The Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1968,
p. 8.
7 It should be recalled that conglomer

ate power is used in various ways to pro
mote the welfare of the conglomerate,
even at the expense of
and in
ways detrimental to competition. While
antitrust laws may deal quite effectively
with the conspicuous uses of conglom
erate-derived power, they may be pow
erless in dealing with subtle competitive
strategies.
8 The president of Gulf and Western, a
conglomerate, has stressed the conglom
erate’s managerial superiority over other
corporate structures. He
what is im
portant is the approach, the concepts,
the make-up, the talents, and the track
record of management. See: David N.
Judelson, “The Role of the Conglomerate
Corporation in Today’s Economy,” Fi
nancial Executive, September, 1968, p.
20, and “A Philosophy For a Conglom
erate Company,”
Horizons, June,
1968, pp. 7-13.
9 See: Joseph G. Bacsik, vice-president
and controller, Ling-Temco-Vought, “The
Ten Commandments . . . Company Ob
jectives and the Budget Plan—in a Large
Organization,” a paper presented at an
American Management Association meet
ing March 18, 1968.
10 See Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Annual
Report, 1967, p. 3.
11 For example, see Judelson, op cit
12 See: Joseph G. Bacsik, Ironing Out
Post-Merger Difficulties,” a paper pre
sented to
seminar, Current Problems
in Financial Management,” National In
dustrial Conference Board, May 15-16,
1968, San Francisco, California.
13 Several mergers became substitutes for
research when it was
matter of get
ting into new fields of technology and
new products.
14 See: John
“Why Do Merg
ers Miscarry?,” Harvard Business Review,
November-December, 1967, p. 91.
15 Managerial efficiency in a conglomer
ate measured by an accounting profit
figure will be at a test during the down
ward cyclical phase or when merger ac
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tivity slows down to almost nil. This may
be the case in 1970.
16 Many top executives in conglomerates
state that they judge the efficiency of
each subsidiary or major unit in total
aggregate by the ratio of pre-tax
to sales. Other ratios and analyses of de
viation are calculated as in any other
a 
good
”a a
ny.
a
17
Many references can be cited. How
dress
erly
ever, see: David N. Judelson, president
of G & W, “The Conglomerate as The
New Economic Frontier,”
paper read
before the Continental Assurance Com
pany, September 11, 1968, and his ad
before the Investment Analysis
Society of Chicago, October 17, 1968.
18 Arthur S. Dewing, “A Statistical Test
of the Success of Consolidation,” Quart
Journal of Economics, November,
1921. While the data used by Mr. Dew
ing are far in the past, the facts of busi
ness reality in the 1960’s show similar
patterns in the case of business con
glomerates.
19 op cit p. 23.
20 In addition, profitability of each sub
sidiary is influenced by the process of
allocation of capital that in turn acts as
a filter to minimize the impact of a
downtrend in certain subsidiary’s profit.
21 Kitching,
cit
22 To reduce such conflict, the establish
ment of a norm or standard which al
lows a divisional manager
certain
proportion of failures is likely to encour
age him to take on more risky projects.
This does not mean that failures are en
couraged; it merely means that success
on every project should not be weighted
so highly by top management that not
enough high-risk projects are undertaken.
If “
performance” is equated with
low failure rate, this will encourage a
behavior that is not in the best interest
of the company, as shown above. See:
Norman Berg, “Strategic Planning in
Conglomerate Companies, HBR, MayJune, 1965, pp. 83-84.
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